Understanding the Assumptions Used to Evaluate Social Security’s Financial Condition

Every recent annual report from Social Security’s Board of Trustees projects that, under the board’s intermediate (best-estimate) assumptions, some three decades into the future Social Security’s income will no longer be sufficient to finance all scheduled benefits in the absence of corrective legislation. The trustees report uses long-term financial projections based — at least in part — on assumptions adopted by the board. In addition, Social Security reform proposals introduced in Congress or developed by outside experts are sometimes evaluated for their potential effect on the program’s financial condition using the same or similar projection methods and assumptions.

The nature and extent of any changes designed to resolve the program’s financing problem depend, of course, on the magnitude of the problem. Although the projection based on the trustees’ intermediate assumptions is generally quoted when discussing Social Security reform proposals, the range of alternative assumptions used by the trustees illustrates the considerable uncertainty about the future. Opponents of major structural reform generally believe that any perceived problem is manageable with modest changes within the current framework. Conversely, proponents of more extensive reforms often argue that the problems are serious enough to demand consideration of approaches outside the current framework.
Recently, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) began making its own projections of Social Security’s financial condition. The CBO uses the demographic projections produced by Social Security’s actuaries, but applies its own economic assumptions. The CBO projections have yielded a long-range deficit somewhat smaller than that under the trustees’ intermediate assumptions.

Experts outside the government have performed independent analyses of various reform proposals, sometimes including their own. These experts also use assumptions in their projections of Social Security’s financial future, and those assumptions may also differ from those used by the trustees.

This issue brief describes the major assumptions used in projections of Social Security’s financial condition and how variations in the assumptions affect the results. The issue brief also encourages policy advocates to disclose the assumptions underlying their reform proposals and to apply assumptions consistently.

Background

Since Social Security’s earliest days, its Board of Trustees has reported annually to Congress on the projected long-range financial status of the system. The trustees base their projections on actuarial assumptions. The actuaries at the Social Security Administration make initial recommendations for these assumptions, which are then modified as deemed necessary by the trustees and their staffs. The final assumptions selected by the trustees are subject to review by the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, who must state in the report his opinion as to whether they are reasonable. Based on these assumptions, the actuarial staff of the Social Security Administration prepares the projections that are presented by the trustees.

The trustees evaluate the program over a 75-year long-range projection period in order to view the adequacy of financing over the lifetime of virtually all current program participants. Typically, the actuaries use year-by-year assumptions about a number of critical economic and demographic parameters for the first 25 years of the projection period and then apply “ultimate” rates over the remainder of the 75-year period. The trustees report describes the assumptions and methods used in detail.

Each year, the Social Security program gains another year of actual experience that can affect the projections in two ways. First, everything else being equal, if experience is more favorable than projected, the system’s financial forecast improves, and if less favorable, the forecast worsens. Secondly, emerging experience also constitutes additional evidence that can be used for setting assumptions. For example, if mortality improves more rapidly than expected, then future mortality expectations might be adjusted to reflect that trend. The normal process provides for monitoring experience to detect any differences between actual experience and past projections, and for fine-tuning assumptions based on the results of this analysis. The actuaries and trustees must use their own judgment about how the future will differ from the past.

When a change occurs in some demographic or economic factor, no one can determine immediately whether the change represents a short-term fluctuation or a long-term trend, just as no one can know if a week without rain is the beginning of a drought. For this reason, changes in assumptions generally lag behind changes in the underlying demographic and economic conditions.
economic experience. For example, the economy has recently experienced an extended period during which productivity has increased at a rate above the historical average. The trustees and actuaries are uncertain whether this is the start of a long-term trend, so this high-productivity growth is substantially reflected in the trustees’ short-term assumptions, but less so in their long-range assumptions. If high-productivity growth persists so that the trustees conclude that it stems from permanent changes in the economy, any resulting change to the long-range assumptions will lag behind by several years the onset of high productivity growth rates.

Generally every four years, the Social Security Advisory Board appoints a technical panel composed of leading economists, demographers and actuaries from outside the Social Security Administration to review the trustees’ assumptions. In the past, these panels have concluded that the trustees’ assumptions are reasonable. However, the technical panels provide independent analysis of the trends affecting Social Security’s finances. The technical panels frequently recommend specific changes to the assumptions. The trustees weigh these recommendations carefully, and often make changes to their assumptions along the lines of these recommendations, although they sometimes choose not to follow some of the recommendations. In the end, the trustees have the final say regarding the assumptions.

The trustees report presents three projections: intermediate, low-cost and high-cost. The intermediate, or “best-estimate,” projection is the one usually cited by policymakers and the news media. The low-cost and high-cost projections show how the results of the projection would change under reasonable alternative scenarios. The trustees report also includes sensitivity analyses that show how the results of the projection would change if one by one a major assumption is changed to its value under the low-cost or high-cost assumption set while the other assumptions remain at their intermediate-cost values. Finally, the trustees report includes an analysis of the results from a stochastic model of the system, in which the projection is run multiple times under different sets of assumptions and the results analyzed statistically to draw conclusions about the probabilities that actual long-term system performance will lie in different ranges, as described in the Academy’s 2005 issue brief, *A Guide to the Use of Stochastic Models in Analyzing Social Security*.

The assumptions that the trustees use for each year’s report are based on their analysis of historical data and expected future trends. The 2009 Academy issue brief, *An Actuarial Perspective on the Social Security Trustees Report*, describes the assumptions the trustees used in their most recent report and major changes since the previous report.

**Assumptions**

The assumptions used for Social Security’s financial projections fall into two broad categories, demographic and economic. Demographic assumptions are used to project the future population, which provides a basis for estimating the number of workers paying into the system, the number of retired- and disabled-worker beneficiaries, and the number of family members and survivors receiving benefits. Economic assumptions are used to project wages and the resulting tax income of the program, benefit amounts, and the investment income on the system’s accumulated assets. Together, these factors are used to calculate the system’s projected annual income and expenses.

Although the assumptions are described one by one, they are not independent of each other. Factors underlying the various economic assumptions tend to move together as the economy experiences cyclical ups and downs and longer-term trends. For example, real wage growth, interest rates and labor force participation rates all tend to be higher and unemployment rates lower when the economy is vigorous. Factors underlying many of the
demographic assumptions also respond to changes in the economy. For example, birth rates and immigration rates tend to be higher and disability rates lower when the economy is vigorous. The trustees take these relationships into account when setting the intermediate assumptions. However, when setting the low-cost and high-cost assumptions, the assumptions that yield the lowest and highest costs are grouped together regardless of whether the resulting combinations are likely to be realized in any plausible scenario.

**Major Demographic Assumptions**

**Fertility:** As workers retire, they are replaced by new entrants into the labor force, most of whom were born in this country. The fertility rate, or average number of children born to a woman during her lifetime (if she survives the child-bearing years), is the primary determinant of whether the number of new workers will be sufficient to pay for the benefits promised, assuming current-law tax rates. A higher fertility rate increases the number of workers coming into the system, improving overall finances. The fertility rate fell from 3.70 in 1957 to an all-time low of 1.74 during the mid-1970s but has increased somewhat since then to slightly above 2.0. Recent reports project the fertility rate will stabilize around this level under the intermediate assumptions.

**Immigration:** Immigration also accounts for some new entrants into the labor force. Indeed, if the fertility rate remains at or below the replacement level (about 2.1 births per woman), then any long-term population growth must come from net immigration, i.e., immigration less emigration. Most immigrants are young and have all or most of their working lifetimes ahead of them when they enter the country, while emigrants are more likely to be in the older part of the age spectrum. Therefore, a higher net immigration rate, like a higher fertility rate, tends to improve overall system finances.

Social Security projections take into account both legal and illegal immigration. (The latter includes those who entered the country legally but overstayed or otherwise violated the terms of their visas.) Legal immigration has increased substantially since World War II, driven primarily by legislative increases in immigration quotas. Under the intermediate assumptions, net legal immigration levels off at approximately the current rate. Past rates of net illegal immigration are subject to much uncertainty, but most demographers agree this rate has also been increasing steadily, and the trustees expect this trend to continue. Before the 2008 report, the actuarial projection took into account only net illegal immigration, so that the assumed age profile of illegal immigrants and emigrants was effectively the same. Beginning in 2008, the trustees have made separate assumptions for illegal immigration and emigration, with a younger age profile for immigrants. This was the major factor in the reduction of the projected long-range actuarial deficit in that year from 1.95 percent to 1.70 percent of taxable payroll.

**Mortality:** The mortality assumptions are perhaps the most publicly debated of the demographic assumptions. The mortality assumptions are used to estimate, among other things, how long retired and disabled workers and their survivors are projected to receive benefits. Mortality assumptions also determine how many workers are expected to die before retirement, often resulting in payments to survivors. Although reductions in pre-retirement mortality reduce the cost of survivor benefits, they also increase the number of workers who will reach retirement age. Reductions in post-retirement mortality result in longer lifetimes for those receiving benefits and generally have a much greater impact on the total cost of benefits. Increases in longevity accelerated greatly in the 1970s, leading the trustees to update the mortality assumptions used for Social Security projections. Since 1982, however, longevity has increased more slowly, and the projected reduction in mortality rates has been relatively stable.
The rate at which longevity will continue to increase is the subject of much debate. Certainly, there is potential for more rapid decrease in mortality based on medical advances that slow disease development or allow better management of chronic conditions such as heart disease, cancer and stroke. Conversely, it is difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate new diseases that may surface in the coming decades, the effect of lifestyle changes, e.g., less smoking but more obesity, how rapidly medical breakthroughs will be accessible to the general population, and whether new treatments will be affordable. There is widespread agreement that death rates will continue to decline in the future; the issue is the pace at which these declines will occur.

**DISABILITY:** The disability-incidence assumption is the most important determinant of the cost of the disability insurance (DI) portion of Social Security. Social Security law provides objective criteria for determining when covered workers become eligible for disability benefits, although some degree of subjectivity is inevitable in applying the law. Partly for this reason, disability-incidence rates tend to be cyclical, depending on the health of the economy and, to some extent, political and social attitudes toward disability. The trustees set the disability incidence assumption initially by looking at past trends and making projections about the future without regard to the increases in the normal retirement age (NRA), or the age at which workers can receive unreduced benefits scheduled under present law. These rates are then adjusted upward to reflect the additional workers who are expected to file for disability benefits because of the scheduled increases in the NRA.

**Major Economic Assumptions**

**WAGE INCREASES:** The nominal (i.e., without adjustment for inflation) increase in wages earned by workers from year to year affects both the revenue received and benefits paid by Social Security. As wages increase, taxes on those wages go up proportionately, raising revenue immediately. However, the formula for determining initial benefits is indexed to wage increases, so higher wages gradually result in higher benefits.

**CONSUMER PRICE INDEX:** Benefits for existing beneficiaries are adjusted automatically each year for inflation. This cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is based on changes in the Consumer Price Index for workers (CPI-W), which is measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Thus, the assumed annual increase in the CPI affects projected future benefit payments. Since automatic adjustment of benefits began in 1975, the annual rate of increase in the CPI has varied widely, from double digits in the early 1980s to near 1 percent in some more recent years.

**INCREASES IN REAL WAGES:** The increase in nominal wages minus the increase in the CPI is called the real-wage differential — the increase in the buying power of wages after adjustment for price increases. Real-wage increases are made possible by increases in the productivity of workers. If wages were used for indexing benefits after commencement, as well as for calculating initial benefits, then the increases in revenue and benefits resulting from real-wage increases would offset each other. However, because benefits after eligibility are indexed to the CPI, any excess of wage increases over CPI increases causes the program’s cost to be lower than would be the case if benefits after eligibility rose at the same rate as wages. The average future rate of increase in real wages is one of the most important factors affecting the financial health of Social Security.

**INTEREST RATES:** Social Security’s assets are invested in special-issue Treasury securities whose interest rates are pegged to the rates on securities issued to the public. Therefore, the interest-rate assumption refers to yields on long-term Treasury securities. Interest rates affect Social Security in two ways. First, higher interest rates raise the return on the system’s accumulated assets and thus improve the financial condition of the program; lower rates...
have opposite effects. Second, higher interest rates reduce the present value of the program’s long-term actuarial deficit. Real interest rates (i.e., nominal interest rates less inflation) have varied widely over the past several decades. Before 1980, real interest rates averaged about 1 percent. In the mid-1980s, the real interest rate rose to 9 percent; since then, it has declined, but except for short periods has generally remained around 3 percent in recent years.

**Labor Force Participation Rates:** Labor force participation rates measure the proportion of the working-age population (including non-covered workers and the unemployed) with earnings covered by Social Security. Generally, those without covered earnings are outside the labor force, in non-covered employment, are unemployed or receiving benefits. Everything else being equal, a higher labor force participation rate increases tax revenue earlier, and increases tax revenue to a greater extent than it increases benefits, thereby improving the program’s financial condition. This is especially true if the proportion of two-earner married couples increases, since the additional payroll tax paid by the lower earning spouse provides additional benefits only to the extent that worker benefits based on that spouse’s own wage record exceed spouse benefits based on the higher earning spouse’s wage record. Conversely, a lower labor force participation rate worsens the program’s financial condition.

Labor force participation rates at ages 60 through 64 have changed considerably since 1985, for both men and women. Before 1985, the labor force participation rate for men at ages 60 through 64 had been decreasing dramatically, from over 80 percent in 1962 to 56 percent in 1985; this rate has since leveled off and actually increased from 53 percent in 1995 to 55 percent in 2000. For women, the labor force participation rate has increased significantly from 33 percent in 1985 to 40 percent in 2000. Possible changes in labor force participation rates in response to demographic changes are among the greatest uncertainties in projecting the future financial condition of Social Security. With expected slower growth in the population at traditional working ages, will older workers want to work longer, and will their employers want to maintain an older workforce?

**Unemployment:** The unemployment rate measures the proportion of workers in the labor force unable to find work. Higher rates of unemployment reduce projected future income. Unemployment also generally reduces benefits, but the effect is much smaller and is largely deferred. Therefore, high unemployment adversely affects the program’s financial health. However, unemployment does not have as significant an impact on system finances as do some of the other factors discussed here.

**GDP Growth:** The trustees do not directly make an assumption regarding the growth of gross domestic product (GDP), which is the total dollar value of all goods and services produced in the United States. The trustees arrive at their estimate of GDP growth indirectly by estimating growth in the labor force and growth in productivity (which is closely related to growth in real wages), both discussed above. GDP growth was high in the 1960s and 1970s, due primarily to the large increases in the labor force. However, if the retirement of the baby boomers leads to a shortage of workers, the labor force component of GDP growth could dramatically decrease. If the labor force growth rate was to slow and productivity does not rise to compensate, GDP growth would decline significantly.

Long-range GDP growth will depend on a variety of factors, such as whether workers retire at a different rate than projected, whether future workers will be more or less productive than assumed, and whether a shortage of workers will lead to a change in immigration law. At present, a wide divergence of views exists on these questions.

Taken together, these assumptions underlie the projections of the program’s short-term and long-term financial condition. These pro-
jections provide policymakers with an indication of whether reform is needed.

Social Security Reform and the Stock-Yield Assumption

Some Social Security reform proposals would invest all or a portion of the assets accumulated to fund future benefits in private-sector securities, particularly stocks. Some of these proposals would allow workers to set up individual accounts; others would continue the current arrangement in which the government directly invests all of the system’s accumulated assets. Advocates for these reform plans assert that investing payroll taxes in common stocks would provide a better return than the special U.S. government securities used by the current program. This claim is based on historical data showing that stocks have consistently outperformed U.S. government interest-bearing securities over long periods — say, 20 years. Although the annual real yield on stocks is not an assumption used in the annual report, such an assumption must be made to evaluate any reform proposals involving stock investments. Not surprisingly, the higher the assumed real yield on stocks, the more favorable proposals for investing Social Security assets in stocks appear.

Many economists question whether the past superior long-term performance of stocks over other investment alternatives will continue. Further, recent volatility in the securities markets has focused investors’ attention on the greater risks inherent in equity investments. These issues are explored in depth in the 2007 Academy issue brief Investing Social Security Assets in the Securities Markets. Given the high degree of uncertainty regarding the future performance of the securities markets, it is important when evaluating any reform proposal that changes the way Social Security assets are invested to use a range of possible yields to illustrate this uncertainty.

Assumptions over an Infinite Time Horizon

For the first time, in its 2003 report the trustees included the program’s unfunded obligations and actuarial balance over an infinite time horizon. Given the uncertainty of projections 75 years into the future, extending these projections into the infinite future can only increase the uncertainty, so that the results can have only limited value for policymakers. This is due largely to anomalies and incongruities that inevitably arise from extending any set of long-range actuarial assumptions to infinity. For example, extending to infinity the assumptions used for labor force participation rates and mortality improvement leads ultimately to a situation where the typical worker is expected to receive benefits for a period longer than he or she pays into the system. It is not surprising that, at the current payroll-tax rate, the OASDI program cannot sustain itself in this situation. However, it seems unreasonable to argue that workers would not extend their working years longer than currently projected, based on extended years of ability to work, and the need to save more beyond Social Security benefits for the lengthened period of retirement.

Mortality improvement by itself has a major impact on Social Security’s projected financial status and presents great difficulties when making long-range projections. Demographers have reached no consensus, despite years of debate, on whether the rate of mortality improvement observed in the last century is sustainable for the very long-term future. Under the trustees’ assumption, mortality improvement will taper off but not disappear entirely over the 75-year valuation period. Some demographers, citing steady robust mortality improvement over the past century, claim the trustees are understating future mortality improvement. The 2003 technical panel, on the other hand, recommends that assumed mortality rates stop declining at some point in the future. Given these sharp disagreements among experts over projecting mortality for 75 years, the futility of reliably projecting mortality over...
an infinite time horizon becomes apparent.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

As Yogi Berra once observed, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Reasonable people can and do disagree about economic and demographic conditions 25, 50 or 75 years into the future. Yet making such assumptions is critical for evaluating the current status of the Social Security program and the various proposals for reforming it.

There have always been some observers who have questioned whether the Social Security trustees’ assumptions are the best basis for evaluating the financial condition of Social Security and the impact of various reform proposals. Certainly other assumptions may also be reasonable, and even small changes in assumptions can, over a 75-year period, lead to large changes in the projections. Any projection over a 75-year period is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. The trustees’ intermediate assumptions are what they are described to be, a best estimate of future demographic and economic trends based on careful study and analysis of all available data.

A number of different proposals for Social Security reform are before the public. When evaluating these plans, policymakers should be aware of the demographic and economic assumptions that underlie the analyses. In some cases, the potential advantages of a particular reform plan may depend as much on the assumptions used as on the proposal’s actual provisions. Furthermore, policymakers should take care that assumptions are being used consistently across all proposals that are being compared.

To remove some of the uncertainty about the effects of Social Security reforms, we make the following recommendations:

1. All analyses of Social Security reform proposals that include financial projections should also include an explanation of the assumptions used.
2. Any such analysis of proposals should use assumptions that are internally consistent.
3. Where substantial uncertainty exists as to the appropriate level of a critical assumption, sensitivity analysis or a range of assumptions should be provided.
4. When calculations for competing reform proposals use different sets of assumptions, comparisons of these proposals should recognize the effects of the differing assumptions.