Medical Malpractice Tort Reform: Lessons from the States

The cost of insuring doctors against medical malpractice claims has increased dramatically in recent years. Skyrocketing premium costs and a string of highly publicized lawsuits have led many physicians to curtail certain high-risk procedures. By reducing the availability of important medical services, this practice of defensive medicine could have serious public-health consequences. In addition, increased malpractice insurance expenses are passed on to patients and health plans, thus fueling medical inflation.

To combat these ill effects, several states have adopted reforms designed to reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance. More recently, Congress has attempted to follow the initiative of the states but has been unable to enact comprehensive medical malpractice tort reforms into law.

To date, state efforts have enjoyed varying degrees of success in reducing medical malpractice insurance rates. What can be learned from the experience of the states? How can these conclusions be applied at the federal level? The American Academy of Actuaries Work Group on Medical Malpractice Reform has studied the impact of state reforms and offers its comments to state and federal officials who are considering national tort reform.

Findings

Any federal medical malpractice tort reform effort should be based on a package of measures that have exhibited some success in stabilizing medical malpractice costs. The most effective elements of such a package are a cap on noneconomic damages and an offset for collateral payments from other sources. These reforms would limit the financial exposure of health-care providers to lawsuits and would ensure that damages could not be collected through multiple suits. While there are significant limitations on data used to study specific tort reforms, persuasive results can be observed by looking at medical malpractice costs in certain states over time and relating that experience to the timing of particular tort reform measures.

In the following comparison of cost levels in three states that have enacted tort reform measures, paid losses of the individual states as a percentage of the U.S. total are used as the measure of costs. The percentage of physicians in each state as a total of U.S. physicians is used as a reasonable benchmark. The degree to which the percentage of paid losses differs from the percentage of physicians measures the effectiveness of the reforms. All else being equal, the relative cost percentages of paid medical malpractice claims should remain constant over time. Any observed changes in a state’s relative cost levels provide an indication of the effectiveness of tort reform. The three states studied are California, New York, and Ohio.
• California. Since the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) package of reforms was enacted in 1975, medical malpractice costs have fallen substantially as a percentage of the U.S. total.

• New York. Individual reform measures were adopted in 1975, 1981, 1985, and 1986. No observable improvement in the state’s relative costs has resulted. The New York reforms did not include a cap on damages.

• Ohio. Reforms enacted in 1975 included a cap on damages. The cap was overturned in 1985, after which costs rose dramatically and have remained high.

California

The California loss data (Exhibit 1) illustrate that while the state’s proportion of the U.S. physician population has remained relatively stable, its per-
percentage of loss payments has dropped dramatically since enactment of the MICRA package of tort reforms. Before MICRA’s adoption in 1975, California’s percentage of loss payments was significantly higher than its proportion of physicians. By 1981, California’s loss payments had dropped and were about even with its percentage of physicians. Since that date, California has continued to benefit from MICRA: Costs continue to drop as a percentage of the U.S. total, even as the percentage of physicians remains stable. Although other factors affect these data, the relationship of decreased relative costs to the timing of reform provides strong evidence for the effectiveness of the MICRA package.

Many opponents of tort reform argue that insurance premiums do not drop after medical malpractice reform. Indeed, costs and premiums normally rise with inflation, and tort reform may only slow the increases. However, the California data show that premiums declined as losses declined. Exhibit 2 compares the paid loss data from Exhibit 1 with California premiums as a percentage of the total U.S. medical malpractice premiums. Although year-to-year fluctuations do occur, premiums have fallen in proportion to the decline in losses. Competition tends to keep companies at an appropriate profit margin, and any extra profits are normally short-lived.

New York

The New York loss experience is shown in Exhibit 3. It shows that the individual tort reform measures implemented in New York did not improve New York’s experience relative to that of other states. New York’s loss payment percentage does not show any observable pattern of decline or improvement over the 19-year period, despite the various tort reform measures adopted. The New York reforms did not include a cap on damages and were enacted in piecemeal fashion. Therefore, this result supports the merits of a cap on damages and the concept of a package of reforms.
Ohio

The final example is Ohio, with data presented in Exhibit 4. The data show a gradual decline in costs following tort reform in 1975. The Ohio cap on damages came under court challenge in 1982, resulting in sharp increases that reached a peak in 1985 when the cap was finally overturned. Since 1985, costs in Ohio have remained high, with no signs of decreasing. Again, the data appear to support a tort reform package and the specific benefit of a cap on noneconomic damages.

Exhibit 4
Malpractice Loss Payments in Ohio as a Percentage of the U.S. Total, 1975–94

[Graph showing the percentage of malpractice loss payments in Ohio compared to the U.S. total from 1975 to 1994]

Conclusions

California’s experience indicates that properly implemented medical malpractice tort reform can reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance. After reviewing several states’ experience with medical malpractice tort reform and examining studies on the issue, the Academy Work Group has concluded the following:

• A package of reforms is more likely than individual reforms to achieve savings in malpractice losses and insurance premiums, and
• Key among the reforms in the package are a cap on noneconomic awards and a mandatory collateral-source offset rule.

For reform to be effective in reducing costs, the cap on noneconomic awards should be established on a per-medical-injury basis at a level low enough to have an impact (e.g., $250,000). In addition, a mandatory collateral-source offset rule is needed to ensure that double and triple damages cannot be collected through multiple suits. Under this rule, each suit would have to consider damages already paid from other sources.

Although these reforms have been successful in reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance, elected officials and regulators must still consider the effects of medical malpractice reform on physicians, consumers, health plans, and other interested parties. When considering medical malpractice reform, state and federal officials should weigh the impact on society as a whole and strive for a balanced, comprehensive solution.